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I.

INTRODUCTION

The trust is the most important and versatile instrument in modem
estate planning.1 Once the instrument is created, the settlor and benefici1. See Frederic W. Maitland, The Unincorporate Body, in 3 THE COLLECrED
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aries rely on the skill and integrity of the trustee to implement the trust
according to plan. The trustee must invest the trust assets according to
the standards dictated by state law."
The law of investment management by trustees is in the midst of a
major revision, based on a revolution in financial theory that has long
been embraced by the market, but until recently, ignored by the law.' The
prudent man rule has been replaced by a new statutory standard, the prudent investor rule, 6 which became effective in Minnesota on January 1,
1997. 7 The new rule frees trustees from rigid and outdated investment
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911), reprinted in
HISTORICAL WRITINGS IN LAw AND JURISPRUDENCE:
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF

FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, at 272 (R. H. Helmholz & Bernard D. Reams, Jr. eds.,
1981) (calling trusts "the greatest and most distinctive achievement performed by
Englishmen in the field ofjurisprudence"); see also 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTr, SCOTT ON
TRUSTS § 1, at 2 (William Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987) (discussing Professor Maitland's observations and suggesting reasons why the creation of the trust
concept was so profound - for example, no other system of law has such a flexible
tool for making dispositions of property); GEORGE M. TURNER, IRREVOCABLE
TRUSTS § 2:2 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing Professor Maitland's observations and adding, "[T]he overall importance of the trust, notjust in the practice of law but also
in everyday business and society, cannot be overstated").
2. See TURNER, supra note 1, § 3:2 (suggesting that when choosing a trustee,
one should consider such important factors as whether the individual has the
necessary experience, capacity, and skills to manage the trust adequately and
whether the individual can pay damages if management is inadequate).
3. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 2(a) (1996) (stating that a trustee shall
invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would); In re Trusteeship of
First Minneapolis Trust Co., 202 Minn. 187, 194, 277 N.W. 899, 903 (1938) (holding that a trustee exercising the power of investment is controlled by all the restrictions imposed by state statutes); see also United States v. Pierce, 137 F.2d 428,
431 (D. Minn. 1943) (holding that legal interests and rights created by a trust instrument are controlled by the law of the state(s) where the instrument was executed, where the settlor and trustee resided, and where the trust estate was delivered and held). In Minnesota, the governing standard was the prudent man rule
prior to January 1, 1997. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.10, subd. 1(a) (1994).
4. The standards established by trust investment law apply to many financial
fiduciaries. SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the ConstrainedPrudent
Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 52 (1987); Gordon Williams, The Trouble with Tbills, FIN. WORLD, July 18, 1995, at 80 (asserting that the new prudent investor rule
covers "trusts, estates, conservatorships, and the like," and probably covers the
administration of 401(k) plans, the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, and Uniform
Transfers to Minors accounts). This Note, however, focuses exclusively on how
the prudent investor rule affects trustees.
5. The revolution in financial theory is modern portfolio theory, discussed
infra Part III.
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt.
a (1992).
7. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 12 (1996) (explaining that Minnesota's
prudent investor rule applies to trusts existing on and created after January 1,
1997, and that as applied to preexisting trusts, the new standard only governs decisions or actions occurring after that date).
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practices and permits them to use the full array of modem investment
tools in selecting and managing investment portfolios. 8 The tradeoff for
this freedom is a higher level of responsibility borne by trustees in the selection and management of portfolios.9 Therefore, prudent trustees and
their legal advisers must fully understand the ramifications of this revision.
This Note outlines Minnesota's Prudent Investor Act.'0 Part II discusses the historical development of trust investment law leading up to the
prudent investor rule. Part III sketches the basic tenets of modern portfolio theory and briefly explains its significant impact upon trust investment
law. Part IV discusses the main reforms instituted by the new rule and
contrasts Minnesota's version of the rule to those established by the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. Finally,
Part V discusses the responsibilities and opportunities for practitioners
under the new prudent investor rule.
II.
A.

THE HISTORY OF TRUST INVESTMENT LAW

Development in England"
The common-law rule regarding investment by trustees was quite re-

strictive.

Absent a provision in the trust instrument authorizing the trus-

tee to invest in other securities, the only proper investment was government securities." England's restrictive trust investment laws resulted from
8. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 2(d) (1996) ("A trustee may invest in
any kind of property or type of investment consistent with the standards of this
section."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE introduction at 6 (1992) (stating that the prudent investor rule recognizes that investments are properly judged on the basis of the roles they are to play in the
portfolio).
9. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 2 (1996).
10. See id. § 501B.151.
11. Some commentators have traced the origins of trust investment law to
Saint Thomas Aquinas or to biblical sources. SeeJ. Alan Nelson, The PrudentPerson
Rule: A Shieldfor the Professional Trustee, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 933, 937-38 (1993) (discussing the development of the prudent investor rule and citing the works of
Saint Thomas Aquinas and Luke 16:1-8, 10). This Note begins, however, with a
discussion of the development of trust investment law in England, where the concept of a trust was first created. See 1 ScoTT, supra note 1, § 1, at 2-3 (discussing
the early development of trusts in England).
12. See 3 ScoTT, supra note 1, § 227.4; John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IowA L. REV. 641, 643 (1996)
("English law got off to a bad start on trust investing."); Nelson, supra note 11, at
938 (calling the English rule "ultra-conservative" and explaining that the courts
placed a premium on safeguarding the trust res to the detriment of income);
Mayo Adams Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 492 (1951)
(stating that British law sought to protect beneficiaries from investment scandals).
13. See 3 ScoTr, supranote 1, § 227.4; Langbein, supra note 12, at 643. One
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a catastrophic collapse of the South Sea Company's share prices early in
the eighteenth century. 4 These restrictive rules remained in force until
1859, when Lord St. Leonards' Act authorized trustees to invest in mortgages on land in the United Kingdom, as well as stock in the Bank of England, the Bank of Ireland, or East India stock. 5 While the scope of trust
investments was further enlarged
through subsequent statutes, it remains
6
quite restrictive in England.1
B.

Development in the United States

In the United States during the late eighteenth century, the state of
trust investment law was unsettled. 7 Courts could not rely on the rigid
English rules requiring investment in government-backed securities, because such investments simply were not readily available.'8 Moreover,
there was insatiable demand for capital to support the budding enterprises of our new nation. 9 Thus, trust investment law was ripe for a clear
statement defining a new standard that would accommodate the realities
of the capital market at that time.20

of the purposes for limiting investment to government securities was to "maintain
a constant market for the royal obligations." Shattuck, supra note 12, at 492. But

see 3 ScoTr, supra note 1, § 227.4 (suggesting that there is insufficient information
to speculate that the English government intended to restrict trustees to government securities).
14. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 643. In the early 1700s, Parliament
authorized trustees to invest in shares of the South Sea Company. See id. Many

trustees took advantage of this opportunity only to have their investments plummet in value the following year. See id.; Nelson, supra note 11, at 938 (discussing
the bursting of the "South Sea Bubble").
15. See3 ScoTT, supra note 1, § 227.4; Langbein, supra note 12, at 643.
16. See 3 ScoTT, supra note 1, § 227.4 n.4 (explaining that the Trustee Act of
1925 permitted trustees to invest half of a trust's funds in "wider-range investments," including stock and securities issued in the United Kingdom by a company incorporated there, and that the Finance Act of 1982 permitted investment
in shares of unit trusts); Langbein, supra note 12, at 643 (explaining that the 50%
equity ceiling remains in effect in England today but that an official revision
commission has begun to consider reforming it).
17. See Shattuck, supra note 12, at 493 (explaining that the period from the
end of the 18th century to the middle of the 19th century was an enterprising and
imaginative -one with respect to the administration of trust funds).
18. See 3 ScoTr, supranote 1, § 227.5, at 441; Shattuck, supra note 12, at 493.
19. See Shattuck, supranote 12, at 493 (explaining that during the late 1700s
and early 1800s, trust assets were invested in such enterprises as new mills, the
clipper trade, and other "semi-speculative enterprises").
20. See Austin Fleming, PrudentInvestments: The Varying Standardsof Prudence,
12 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 243, 243 (1977) (explaining that because there was
no readily available equivalent to the government-backed securities required under English law, American courts considered whether trustees should be limited
to investing in nation-building securities).
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1. Harvard College v. Amory
The necessary pronouncement came in 1830, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided Harvard College v. Amory.2 ' This single decision is universally recognized as establishing the prudent man
rule. The court stated:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall
conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to
observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested. 3
The aspect of the Harvard College decision which has brought it so
much praise is its flexibility. 24 The decision "freed [trustees] from the ancient English shackles and pointed the way toward 2 5[investment strategies]
which could be imaginative, daring, [and] fruitful."
The prudent man rule was met with two drastically different reactions. 26 Many courts and commentators feared that trustee freedom would
lead trustees to squander trust assets through risky investments.2 1 Still
others praised the rule's flexibility and the way it enabled trustees to keep
pace with changing investment practices. Initially, most states opted for

21. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
22. See, e.g., 3 ScoTr, supra note 1, § 227.5, at 442; Gordon, supra note 4, at
57; see also infra notes 48-80 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of
the prudent man rule).
23. HarvardCollege, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 461.
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE introduction at 3 (1992) (stating that the prudent man rule initially was intended to be
general and flexible); Shattuck, supranote 12, at 494.
25. Shattuck, supra note 12, at 494.
26. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 552
(1964). Professor Friedman argues that in trust investment law, two main approaches have been used: the prudent man rule, which permits trustees to invest
in any investment, provided the decision is consistent with the standard of the
prudent man; and the legal list approach, which dictates which investments are
prudent on a per se basis. See id.
27. States reacting this way generally opted for the legal list approach. See
infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text for a discussion on the resurgence of legal lists.
28. See BEvIs LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE
PRUDENT MAN RULE 12 (1986) (noting that despite the prudent man standard's
advantages, it was not accepted outside of Massachusetts until the 1940s); William
P. Wade, The New California PrudentInvestor Rule: A Statutory InterpretativeAnalysis,
20 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1, 16 (1985) (observing the flexible nature of the
prudent man rule and its adaptability to contemporaneous investment methodology). States benefiting from the flexibility of the prudent man rule generally
adopted it as their trust investment standard. See Shattuck, supra note 12, at 502
(listing the states which generally stood by the prudent man rule during a period
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the conservative approach - legal lists.'
2. The Resurgence of Legal Lists
In the late nineteenth century,30 trust investment law rejected the
flexibility of the Harvard College rule in favor of the restrictive laws of England."1 In 1889, the New York Court of Appeals prohibited trustees from
investing trust assets in stocks, 2 but it allowed more secure trust investments, such as government or corporate bonds and individual debt secured by mortgages on real estate. 5 In addition, the New York State legisin which most states instituted legal lists).
29. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the resurgence of legal lists.
30. Little can be said about the development of trust investment law in
Minnesota between the Harvard College decision in 1830 and the resurgence of
legal lists in the late 1800s. No relevant cases were decided in Minnesota during
that period, nor were there any legislative pronouncements. Cf Shattuck, supra
note 12, at 495 (suggesting that practitioners immediately narrowed Harvard College's flexible rule in response to the maturation and repose of the domestic
economy); Friedman, supra note 26, at 551-72 (discussing cases from around the
country, generally documenting the narrowing of the rule toward legal lists, and
concluding that most states were not prepared to adopt the HarvardCollege rule).
31. See Shattuck, supra note 12, at 499. Shattuck observes that by 1900 a
large majority of states had enacted legal lists, but more importantly, because
many of the legal list states were economically powerful, the greatest accumulation of capital was invested in legal list states. See id.; see also Langbein, supra note
12, at 643 (observing that some of the states' standards, which created "legal lists"
of prudent per se investments during the 19th and early 20th centuries, were
"similar" to the ultraconservative English standards).
32. See King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 89-90 (1869). The court reasoned that
investing in equities is unacceptable because as soon as the money is invested in
the stock of a company, it is out of the immediate control of the trustee. See id. at
88. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the principal will ever be returned. See
id. The court noted that "because prudent men may, and often do, conduct their
own affairs with the hope of growing rich, and therein take the hazard of adventures which they deem hopeful," it does not necessarily follow that trustees can do
the same. Id. at 86. Rather, because the preservation of the principal and the
earning of a "just" income are the principal goals sought to be achieved in creating a trust, those goals should dictate how the trustee invests. See id. During the
legal list era, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressed the same concern for the
preservation of capital and lack of concern for growth of capital as expressed in
King v. Talbot. See Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 376, 200 N.W. 76, 88
(1924) (requiring sound discretion by trustees in both securing income for the
life tenant and preserving trust principal for the remaindermen).
33. See King, 40 N.Y. at 90; see also 3 ScoTr, supra note 1, § 227.5, at 441-42
(suggesting that the New York Court of Appeals might have applied such a restrictive rule because of the relative availability in New York, unlike Massachusetts, of
traditionally safe investments such as government and municipal bonds and
mortgages on land); Stephen P. Johnson, Trustee Investment: The Prudent Person
Rule or Modern Portfolio Theory, You Make the Choice, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1175, 1176
(1993) (explaining that the King court undoubtedly was concerned about the
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lature codified a list of prudent investments, along with a warning that any
34
divergence from the list would expose trustees to liability. Over the next
decade, similar legal lists dominated trust investment law in a majority of
states. 5 The legal list era lasted for almost fifty years.3 6
3.

The Return of the Prudent Man Rule

In the 1940s, states began to abandon their lists and, once again,
adopt the more flexible prudent man rule." This shift was motivated by
several factors." During the Great Depression, no single type of investment (including those dictated by legal lists) survived without a substantial
decrease in value.39 As a result, the justification for accepting lower returns - safeguarding principal - was weakened substantially.
In the
1930s, an outspoken lobby for corporate trustees fought to eliminate the
legal list approach. 41 In 1940, two lawyers drafted a model prudent man
American economy's slide into post-war depression and the dramatic decrease in
the value of stocks).
34. See RobertJ. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, The New Prudent Investor Rule and
the Modern Portfolio Theory: A New Direction for Fiduciaries,34 AM. Bus. L.J. 39, 43
(1996) (citing Act of Mar. 15, 1889, ch. 65, 1889 N.Y. Laws 63).
35. See supra note 31. Minnesota's first legal list was introduced in 1905. See
MINN. REv. LAwS § 3022 (1905). The section listed seven types of "authorized securities," which included United States bonds, state bonds, municipal bonds,
notes secured by mortgages on real estate in Minnesota and neighboring states,
certain bank notes, and certain railroad notes. See id.
36. For a general discussion of the legal list era, see Friedman, supra note
26, at 564-71; Shattuck, supranote 12, at 499-501.
37. See Shattuck, supra note 12, at 501. The term "flexible" is used relatively
here. While the prudent man rule is clearly more flexible than the legal lists, several commentators began to criticize the prudent man rule for its rigidity. See,
e.g., Gordon, supra note 4, at 55 (advocating that the prudent man rule be more
consistent with modem portfolio theory; noting a paradox where "a rule founded
on the adaptable wit of the prudent man has become a hindrance to sound fiduciary investment").
38. See Shattuck, supra note 12, at 499-501 (citing, inter alia, the following
factors as contributing to the shift toward the prudent man rule: an increasing
amount of aggregate trust assets, a corresponding shrinking number of eligible
securities, and a yield in portfolios that were limited to legal investments of about
two percent annually, while it was almost four percent under the prudent man
rule).
39. See LONGSTRETH, supra note 28, at 12 (noting that several factors, including the collapse of bond values, led to a shift from legal lists to the prudent man
standard during the Depression); see also Gordon, supra note 4, at 57 n.12 ("The
Depression showed that virtually no instrument was immune from default or
payment moratorium.").
40. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 87 (explaining that competition for trust
business seems to have been the main impetus for the shift).
41. See Aalberts & Poon, supra note 34, at 43 (noting that several parties,
particularly bankers, tried to eliminate legal lists in the 1930s); Nelson, supra note
11, at 940-41 (explaining that in 1933, the Executive Committee of the Trust Divi-
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rule,42 which many states adopted in some form.43
The prudent man rule remained the guiding principle for trustees
for almost fifty years." In the 1990s, however, it has begun to give way to
the prudent investor rule.45 In order to understand the criticism of the
prudent man rule and the changes instituted by the prudent investor rule,
one must understand the elements of the prudent man rule" as established by commentary and judicial pronouncements. 47 First, a trustee may
sion of the American Bankers Association adopted a Statement of Principles of
Trust Institutions that stated, among other things, that the trustee's investment
function should be evaluated in terms of management and care, rather than safekeeping or speculating); see also Langbein, supra note 12, at 644 (concluding that
one of the ways the prudent man rule won out was by the promotion of the
American Bankers Association on behalf of corporate fiduciaries).
42. See Aalberts & Poon, supra note 34, at 43-44 (explaining how Louis S.
Headley and Mayo Adams Shattuck responded to the plight of legal list jurisdictions by drafting a "Model Prudent Man Investment Statute"). The model act is
reprinted in Shattuck, supra note 12, app. A at 508-09.
43. See Shattuck, supra note 12, at 501-04 (listing the states that made the
switch). For a general discussion of the move from legal lists to the prudent man
rule in the 1940s, see Bruce Stone, The PrudentInvestor Rule: Conflux of the Prudent
Man Rule with Modern Portfolio Theory, in ESTATE PLANNING & ADMINISTRATION 1993,
at 9, 14-15 (PLI Tax L. & Est. Plan. Course Handbook Series No. D4-5242, 1993),
which discusses the recovery from the depression, the lobby for change by the
American Bankers Association, and the Model Act and concludes that the prudent man rule "was adopted with minor variations in virtually all the states and
superseded legal list statutes" by the 1960s. In 1943, Minnesota abandoned its legal list for individual and corporate trustees and adopted the prudent man rule,
calling it the prudent person rule. See Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 635, §§ 1-6, 1943
Minn. Laws 980, 981-82; see also Note, Current Legislation - Minnesota, 1943, 31
MINN. L. REV. 35, 86 (1946) (announcing the enactment of the prudent man rule
and explaining that the rule permits trustees to invest in any kind of property that
an ordinary prudent person would).
-44.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE introduc-

tion at 3 (1992) ("In generally similar language, influenced by the original Restatement, the prudent man rule has been adopted by decision or legislation in
most American jurisdictions, often displacing the more restrictive, so-called 'legal
list' statutes."); LONGSTRETH, supra note 28, at 12 (noting that in 1986, the prudent man rule was "overwhelmingly the standard for investment of private trust
funds"); Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern
Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REv. 87, 90 (1990). Haskell explains that in 1990, only
Alabama, Kentucky, and Maryland had legal lists limited to debt securities, and
only Ohio and West Virginia had lists providing for debt securities plus a maximum percentage of common stocks. See id. at 90 & nn.14-15. The remaining
states all follow the prudent person rule. See id. at 90 & n.16.
45. See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the prudent investor rule).
46. See Wade, supra note 28, at 2-3 (summarizing the elements of the prudent man rule).
47. Professor Austin Wakeman Scott, the reporter of both the first and second Restatements and the author of the leading treatise on trusts, is credited with
playing an extremely significant role in shaping the prudent man rule. See
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not speculate. Second, the trustee must evaluate the merits of each investment individually and apart from other investments of the trust.
Third, the trustee must diversify. Fourth, the trustee must use the skill of
a prudent person. Fifth, the trustee must follow the terms of the trust.
Sixth, the trustee many not delegate investment authority.
a.

Speculation

Trustees have an affirmative duty to make the trust property productive. 8 Under the prudent man rule, the guidelines, within which a trustee
had to fulfill that responsibility, were quite narrow. 9 While at first blush
prudence seems to be a broad standard, interpretations of the prudent
man statutes required the trustee to avoid speculation ° and preserve capital5 at all costs. The Restatement explains the standard:
In making investments .... a loss is always possible, since in any
investment there is always some risk. The question of the amount of
risk, however, is a question of degree. No man of intelligence would
make a disposition of property where in view of the price the risk of
loss is out of proportion to the opportunity for gain. Where, however,
the risk is not out of proportion, a man of intelligence may make a
disposition which is speculative in character with a view to increasing
his property instead of merely preserving it. Such a disposition is not a
proper trust investment, because it is not a disposition
which makes
52
the preservation of the fund a primary consideration.
Thus, under the prudent man rule, the trustee had to distinguish between those investments for which the risk of loss was excessive and those
Gordon, supra note 4, at 57-62 (observing that Professor Scott's version of the
prudent man rule narrowed the rule from its original HarvardCollege formulation
and that many courts, out of respect for Scott, adopted his version); see also
LONGSTRETH, supra note 28, at 13 ("[I]t would be almost impossible to underestimate the influence of the Treatise and the Restatement. They have both achieved
canonical standing in the law of private trusts."). Because few cases have been decided in Minnesota clarifying the different elements of the prudent man rule, and
because Professor Scott's statements of the rule were so often followed, the discussion below of the elements of the rule relies heavily on the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts. See infranotes 48-80 and accompanying text.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 181 (1959); 2A SCOTT, supranote
1, § 181, at 542-43.
49. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 644 (stating that the prudent man rule
became "encrusted with a strong emphasis on avoiding so-called 'speculation'").
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. f (1959) (stating that
both the purchase of shares of stock on margin and the purchase of bonds selling
at a great discount because of the uncertainty of whether they will be paid on maturity are speculative and imprudent); see also Langbein, supra note 12, at 645
("Ludicrous judicial applications of the notion of speculation continued in some
jurisdictions into recent times.").
51. See3AScoTT, supra note 1, § 227, at 431.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. a (1959).
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for which the risk of loss was prudent. 5 Broad categories of investments
were considered imprudent per se.54 A trustee investing in growth stocks, 55
-utu
start-ups, 56 options, and futures57
might have faced a surcharge action if
5
those assets depreciated. " These
rules motivated trustees to invest in as59
sets that were per se prudent.
b.

The IndividualInvestment Standard

Under the prudent man rule, each investment was considered on its
own merits, without regard to the rest of the portfolio.n6 This concept is
reinforced by the anti-netting rule, which provides, in essence, that a trustee who is liable for making a speculative investment cannot reduce the
amount of his liability by offsetting the loss against a gain obtained on another part of the trust property. 6 This rule has led trustees to ensure that
each individual asset held in trust is not speculative.62

53. SeeWade, supranote 28, at 3.
54. See 3 Scorr, supra note 1, § 227.6, at 444 (explaining that buying securities on margin, speculative shares of stock, and discounted bonds would be per se
imprudent).
55. Seeid. § 227.11, at471.
56. See id. § 227.6, at 444 n.4 (citing cases). But see MINN. STAT. § 501B.125,
subd. la (1986) (repealed 1987) (permitting a trustee to invest up to 10% of the
trust estate in new and untried enterprises with growth potential).
57. See Note, CurrentInvestment Questions and the PrudentPerson Rule, 13 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 650, 653 (1978) (concluding that there is no clear judicial
precedent approving of futures, and that options are risky for the fiduciary because of the traditional rule prohibiting a fiduciary from netting losses against
trust gains).
58. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 701, at
193 (rev. 2d ed. 1982) (explaining that if the trustee breaches her duty to invest
prudently, the beneficiaries can bring an action against the trustee to receive a
surcharge equal to the difference between the return on a prudent investment
and the return on the imprudent investment).
59. SeeJohn H. Martin, A Preface to the Prudent Investor Rule, TR. & EST., Nov.
1993, at 42, 42-43 (noting the strictures of prudent man standards where trustees
want to embrace new investment vehicles and not simply opt for investments that
have been judicially or legislatively deemed prudent per se).
60. See Haskell, supranote 44, at 93.

61.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TRUSTS

§ 213 cmt. b (1959); Gordon, su-

pranote 4, at 96-97 (discussing the anti-netting rule).
62. SeeJ. Timothy Ritchie, PrudentInvestor Rule is Not a Radical Departure,TR.
& EST.,Jan. 1991, at 18, 18. Ritchie writes:
A major criticism of the current prudent person rule has been that it
mandates the avoidance of risk-taking with respect to each asset of a
portfolio, viewing the taking of the risk as impermissible speculation.
Consequently, portfolio managers for fiduciary funds have adopted conservative investment approaches with respect to each asset of a portfolio,
even though by doing so there will be limited opportunity for appreciation in value of the portfolio as an entity.
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c.

Diversification

The diversification rule is simply a corollary to the basic riskminimization philosophy of the prudent man rule: A diversified trust is
less risky than a trust where all of the assets are invested in one security.'
Thus, a trustee must distribute the risk of loss by a reasonable diversification of investments, unless prudence dictates otherwise.6
d.

Standardof Skill

In carrying out investment responsibilities, a trustee must, at a minimum, use the skill of a person of ordinary prudence. 6 If, however, the
trustee has or represents that he has greater skill than that of an ordinary
prudent person, the trustee is liable for any loss resulting from the failure
to use such skill.66 The standard for measuring the trustee's skill is the
same as the reasonable man standard in the law of negligence.6 ' Thus,
skill is assessed by comparing the trustee's investment
decisions to those
6
made by similarly-situated trustees in the industry.
e.

Terms of the Trust

In general, the terms of the trust instrument defining permissible investments will supersede otherwise applicable legal restrictions. 69 Thus, a
settlor may enlarge7 ° or restrict" the scope of permissible investments for a
particular trust, for example, by permitting investment in speculative secu72
rities. However, trust terms generally are construed strictly against an enId.

63. SeeWade, supra note 28, at 4.
64.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TRUSTS § 228 (1959); 3 SCOTT, supra note

1, § 228, at 501-02 (explaining that a duty to diversify trust investments has been
recognized in American trust law for about a century).
65. See In reTrusts Created by Hormel, 504 N.W.2d 505, 511 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
66.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TRuSTS § 174 (1959).

67.
68.

See Langbein, supra note 12, at 644.
See id.

69.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. q (1959); see also In re

Trusteeship Under Agreement With Mayo, 259 Minn. 91, 96-97, 105 N.W.2d 900,
904 (1960) (holding that where a trust instrument restricts the scope of permissible investment, the court will permit trustees to deviate therefrom only if the purposes of the trust would otherwise be defeated or substantially impaired).
70.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. s (1959).

71. See id. § 227 cmt. r.
72. See id. § 227 cmts. s & u; see also In re Trusteeship of First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 202 Minn. 206, 208, 277 N.W. 909, 910 (1938) (holding that where a
testamentary trust directed investment of trust funds in corporate stocks, the corporate trustee was not precluded from making such investments by statute, but
was required to comply with the directions given).
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73
largement of the scope of permissible investments.
For instance, even in the face of extreme circumstances, the Minnesota Court of Appeals adhered to this principle in In re Trusts Created by
Hormel.74 The founder of George A. Hormel & Company placed a majority
share of the company's stock in trust for his children, directing the trustee
to maintain a controlling interest under all circumstances. 7 After the
trust was created, Hormel's stock began to decrease dramatically in value.7
The beneficiaries brought an action against the trustee to sell some or all
of the ailing stock in an effort to maintain the value of the trust assets.7
The court refused to force the trustee to sell the stock, stating, "When a
matter is entrusted to the trustee's discretion, a court generally should not
intervene unless that discretion has been abused."78

f

Delegation

Under the prudent man rule, a fiduciary could not delegate investment authority.7 9 Thus, even if a fiduciary was selected strictly because of
the relationship with the trustor rather than for investment expertise, the
fiduciary remained personally liable for all investment decisions, regardless of the trustee's level of expertise.80

III. MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY
The prudent man rule has been the subject of sharp criticism since
its creation. 8' According to critics, the rule is neither sufficiently versatile
to permit trustees to invest trust assets in modem investments nor consistent with modern investment theories. 82 The prudent investor rule is

73.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. u (1959).

74. 504 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 512.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 cmt. h (1959) ("A trustee

cannot properly delegate to another power to select investments.").
80. See id.; see also infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text (discussing
criticism of the nondelegation rule and the evolution towards a permissive rule).
81.

See Nelson, supra note 11, at 941 (noting the continuous criticism of the

model prudent man rule since its creation); see also Gordon, supra note 4, at 54 &
n.5.
82. See LONGSTRETH, supra note 28, at 13 (noting the model statute's original
intent to emancipate, but recognizing that the rule had become "rigid and anach-

ronistic in application, particularly in light of modem portfolio theory and investment techniques"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT
INVESTOR RULE introduction at 3-4 (1992) (explaining that the new rule developed
in response to concerns that many jurisdictions had adopted overly rigid interpre-

tations of the prudent man rule; noting that such "arbitrary restrictions on trust
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meant to accord trust law with the practice of the investment management
industry generally."" Specifically, the Uniform Prudent Investor Act incorporates the teachings of modem portfolio theory.8'
One of the central tenets of modern portfolio theory is that large
and essentially costless gains can be achieved simply by diversifying thoroughly.15 As a corollary, the prudent investor rule: (1) provides that a
trustee who fails to take advantage of these gains acts imprudently, and
(2) focuses its analysis not on the prudence of each individual asset, but6
on the ability of the trustee to diversify an entire portfolio effectively.
This Part explains how diversification leads to large and essentially costless
gains.
People invest their money with the expectation that they will be
compensated for its use. Investors know that they can invest with essentially no risk in short-term U.S. government debt. 7 Thus, any investment
involving a risk of default or a disappointing return requires the person
raising the capital to pay the investor some return greater than that of
government bonds. 8 Indeed, all investments have an expected return
that varies positively with risk.8 9 Risk is the recognized possibility that an

investments are unwarranted and often counterproductive" in light of modem
asset management practices); Fleming, supra note 20, at 248-51 (criticizing the
Model Prudent Man Investment Statute for failing to measure the prudence of
investments in terms of a net portfolio as opposed to a single investment, failing
to address inflation, and failing to discuss the duty to diversify).
83. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, 7B U.L.A. 18-19 (Supp. 1996) ("Over
the quarter century from the late 1960's, the investment practices of fiduciaries
experienced significant change. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) undertakes to update trust investment law in recognition of the alterations that have
occurred in investment practice.").
84. See id. at 19 (noting the influence of modern portfolio theory, which is
described as "empirical and theoretical knowledge about the behavior of capital
markets"). Modem portfolio theory has been shaped by four decades of important academic research as to the optimal methods of investment management. See
Langbein, supra note 12, at 642. Four Nobel Prizes in economics have thus far
been awarded for the academic work that identified and verified the theory of efficient markets. See id. For explanations of modem portfolio theory and its relationship to the prudent investor rule, see Haskell, supra note 44, at 100-06; Langbein, supra note 12, at 647-49; Robert A. Levy, The PrudentInvestor Rule: Theories
and Evidence, 1 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 10-19 (1994); Martin, supra note 59, at 4445; Stephen M. Penner, International Investment and the Prudent Investor Rule: The
Trustee's Duty to Consider International Investment Vehicles, 16 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 601,
622-36 (1995); and Stone, supra note 43, at 9.
85. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 647.
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE introduction at 5-6 (1992).
87. See Haskell, supra note 44, at 100.
88. See id.
89. See id. See generally Penner, supra note 84, at 623-27 (discussing individual risk aversion and its effect on an individual's willingness to invest).
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investment will perform below its expected return. 90 As the possibility that
an investment will perform under its expected return increases, so too
does its risk.91 The greater the risk, the greater the expected return must
be in order to justify or compensate for the risk.9 2 For example, a fledgling computer software company bears a far larger financial risk than does
a company like IBM. 9' Thus, those investing in the start-up company demand a higher rate of return than those investing in IBM. 94 Because risk
determines a given security's rate of return, it is important to understand
what "risk" is, and what about it is compensated.
Modern portfolio theory isolates three distinct components of the
risk of owning any security: market risk, industry risk, and firm risk.9
Market risk represents the idea that all common stocks are affected by the
risk of a rise or fall in the stock market.96 It reflects general economic and
political conditions, interest rates, and so forth.97 Industry risk is specific
to the firms in a particular industry."' It represents the risk that an event
could cause industry-wide gains or losses. 99 For example, in the wake of
the 1973 Arab oil embargo, all oil producers suffered a tremendous drop
in their stock prices.'00 Finally, firm risk refers to the factors that affect the
profitability of an individual firm, such as labor disputes, management
changes, accidents, and the like.'9
By definition, market risk cannot be eliminated through diversification, since market risk is common to all securities;' ° however, industry and
firm risk can be greatly reduced.' 3 To understand why, consider a simple
example.'
Imagine an investor who holds two assets: $10,000 in the

90. See Haskell, supranote 44, at 100.
91. See id.
92. See id.

93. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 647. This example is taken from Professor Langbein's recent article discussing the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Haskell, supra note 44, at 100-01; Langbein, supra note 12, at 647;

Penner, supra note 84, at 629.
96. See Langbein, supranote 12, at 647.

97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Haskell, supra note 44, at 101 (grouping firm and industry risk together into a concept called unsystemic or specific risk).
100. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR AcT § 3 cmt., 7B U.L.A. at 23-24 (Supp.
1996) (using the oil embargo as an example of industry risk); see also Langbein,
supra note 12, at 647 (demonstrating both industry and firm risk using the oil em-

bargo as an example).
101.
102.

See Langbein, supra note 12, at 647.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE introduc-

tion at 6 (1992).
103. See Haskell, supra note 44, at 101.
104. See Penner, supra note 84, at 628-29. This example is adapted from a
similar example used by Stephen M. Penner. See id.
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stock of Hurricane Insurance Company, which offers storm accident insurance coverage; and $10,000 in the stock of Building Materials Company, which manufactures and sells building materials to replace damaged
structures. 0 5 Imagine that a hurricane ravages the southeastern seaboard. 1 6 The insurance company will be forced to make good on many
claims and, as a result, its profits will fall.'07 Consequently, the price of its
stock will fall.108 At the same time, however, the hurricane will spur demand for the products of Building Materials Company,' °9 which can increase prices and ultimately increase its profits. 0 As a result, the value of
its stock will go up." Thus, the investor has been able to reduce the effect
of the risk of hurricanes by investing in two assets which react oppositely
to a given situation." 2 In other words, the investor can balance the industry and firm risk of one stock with the purchase of another stock which is3
affected positively by the same factor that adversely affects the first stock."
Under the terminology of modem portfolio theory, industry and firm
risk is called uncompensated risk, and market risk is called compensated
risk." 4 The distinction requires the introduction of one more principle,
market efficiency. In theory, markets are perfectly efficient, which is to
say that once information becomes public, stock prices react to it immediately." ' Since it is common knowledge that industry and firm risk can be
eliminated through diversification, the marketplace will not compensate
an investor for taking that risk." 6 Thus, it is an uncompensated risk."2
Similarly, because it is common knowledge that market risk cannot be
avoided through diversification, those taking market risk are compensated
by higher expected returns.
Theoretically, industry and firm risk can be reduced to zero by including in a portfolio many different securities designed to offset one an-

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 628.
See id.
See id. at 628-29.
See id. at 629.
See id.
See Penner, supra note 84, at 629.
See id.
See id.

113. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 647-48 (extending his oil embargo example to explain how investments that react differently to different risk factors, or
negatively correlated investments, can be used to eliminate firm and industry
risk).
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227
cmt. e (1992).
115. See id. reporter's general note on cmts. e-h, at 74-75.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
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other's different risk factors.119 The larger the portfolio, the closer the industry and firm risk of the portfolio can approach zero. 20 However, industry and firm risk can be reduced with as few as twenty stocks.12 ' Thus, contemporary economic theory suggests that the investor should maintain
a
level. 22
broad portfolio in order to reduce firm and industry risk to a low
Contemporary economic thinking even allows for the inclusion of investments of a speculative nature in a portfolio that is conservatively invested."2 If speculative assets complement the other assets in a portfolio
in such a way that industry and firm risk for the portfolio as a whole is decreased, then the risk of the portfolio is decreased and the portfolio as a
whole is better off.14 Under the prudent man rule, this strategy would be
an invitation to liability for two reasons. Because of the duty to avoid
speculative investments" 25 and the fact that prudence is measured by looking at the speculative investment individually, 6 the trustee has breached
the trust if a speculative investment is not successful, even if the portfolio
as a whole is successful. "2 Under the prudent investor rule, this strategy
would be applauded and even required."'
IV. THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE
A.

Emergence of the New Rule

As modern portfolio theory became widely accepted in economics
and investment management, the law lagged behind."9 Recognizing this
anomaly, the trust bar began a comprehensive review process that resulted

119. See Penner, supra note 84, at 628-34 (explaining how industry and firm
risk, or "idiosyncratic risk," can be eliminated through diversification). Specifically, Penner states that "[t] he point of diversification is to invest not only in multiple assets but to invest in assets which tend to complement each other as far as
risk is concerned." Id. at 628.
120. See id. at 633-34.
121. See Haskell, supra note 44, at 102.
122. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR
RULE introduction at 5 (1992).
123. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 654-55.
124. See id.
125. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text (discussing the trustee's
duty, under the prudent man rule, to avoid speculation).
126. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing the individual
investment standard).
127. See id.
128. See infra Part IV.B.3-4 (discussing how the portfolio standard and the
direction to diversify, consistent with modern portfolio theory, free trustees to invest in speculative assets).
129.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT introduc-

tion at 4 (1992).
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in the prudent investor rule.3 ° The objective was to articulate a standard
which allows various sound investment strategies and is flexible enough to
adapt to the inevitable changes in the market, but which also imposes a
meaningful duty of prudence on fiduciaries.13' Whereas traditional investment practices principally benefited the trustee, by creating a safe
harbor from liability, the new rule forces trustees to serve the specific interests of settlors and beneficiaries. 32 At least thirteen states have enacted
some version of the prudent investor rule, 133 and most states likely will
adopt that standard soon.14 Minnesota enacted its prudent investor rule
in 1996.'
130. See id. The prudent investor rule is a product of the American Law Institute's 1992 Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the National Conference of Commissioners on State Laws' 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 641. In 1987, the American Law Institute (ALI) began working on
a partial revision of the Restatement of Trusts devoted exclusively to modifying
trust investment law. See id. In particular, the ALl set out to "reexamine the traditional prudent-person rule of trust management in light of contemporary investment practices and portfolio theory." BOGERT, supra note 58, § 671, at 6 n.14
(Supp. 1996) (quoting 9 A.L.I. REP. 9 (July 1987)). The ALl approved the new
Restatement at its annual meeting in 1990 and released the final text in 1992. See
id. § 671, at 6. The final text is the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT
INVESTOR RULE at v (1992). Professor Edward C. Halbach, Jr., of the University of
California at Berkeley, served as the reporter and principal drafter. See id. For a
discussion of the drafting project, see Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law
in the Third Restatement, 77 IowA L. REV. 1151 (1992), republished in substantialpart
in Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 407 (1992), and Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Redefining the "Prudent Investor Rule"for Trustees, TR. & EST., Dec. 1990, at 14.
In 1991 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) began a three-year drafting project to codify the revised Restatement
principles as a uniform law, which became the Uniform Prudent Investor Act
(UPIA). See Langbein, supra note 12, at 641. NCCUSL promulgated the final text
of the UPIA in 1994.

See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR Acr, 7B U.L.A. 18 historical

notes (Supp. 1996). The American Bar Association approved the UPIA at its February 1995 midyear meeting. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 641.
131.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR ACr introduc-

tion at 4 (1992).
132. See id. at 5.
133.

See CAL. PROB. CODE § 16045 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 15-1.1-101 (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.11 (West Supp. 1995); 760
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5 (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§
15-106, -114 (Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. § 501B.151 (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-7601 (Michie 1995); N.Y. EST. POwERS & TRUSTS LAw § 11-2.3 (McKinney 1997);

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.60 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 128.005(2)
(Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-302 (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1
(Michie Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 11.100.010 (West Supp. 1995).
134. See Stone, supra note 43, at 40 ("[T] he trickle of prudent investor legislation that has passed in the past ten years will become a flood.").
135.

See Minnesota Prudent Investor Act, ch. 314, § 4(1), 1996 Minn. Laws

189, 191-93 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 501B.151 (1996)).
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Stated simply, the prudent investor rule provides that trustees "shall
invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would." 136 The heart
of the prudent investor rule is a focus on the portfolio as a whole. 7 The
rule recognizes that the key job of the trustee is to determine the trade-off
between the risk and the return necessary to realize the trust's objectives.' -" Moreover, the rule abolishes absolute restrictions and disavows the
prior law's prohibition of speculative or risky investments. 39 Finally, dele-°
gation of investment responsibilities is permitted and even encouraged.'
B.

Components of the New Rule
1.

Abrogating CategoricRestrictions

Under the prudent man rule, courts and commentators warned trustees to avoid speculation. 4' Prior to 1997, Minnesota's prudent person
rule ostensibly permitted trustees to invest in every kind of property;1' yet
it was not clear whether the rule required trustees to avoid speculation.

3

It offered the same freedom in 1943.'44 In any event, prudent practitioners, wary of precedents in other states, most likely counseled trustees to
avoid speculation.
136. MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 2 (1996). Minnesota's Prudent Investor
Act [hereinafter MPIA] and the UPIA are almost identical. See infra notes 199-212
and accompanying text (describing where the two acts diverge).
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE introduction at 6 (1992).
138. See id. § 227 reporter's general note on cmts. e-h, at 74-75.
139. See infraPart IV.B.1 (discussing the abrogation of per se rules).
140. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution
of the delegation rule).
141. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text (discussing the trustee's
duty to avoid speculation).
142. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.10, subd. 1 (1994) (repealed 1996).
143. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text (discussing a trustee's
duty to avoid speculation). Although no Minnesota appellate courts have classified any investments as per se prudent or imprudent, dictum in one Minnesota
Supreme Court decision suggests that courts may entertain the idea. See In re Will
of Gershcow, 261 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1977). In Gershcow, the court held that
investing in certificates of deposits was not "per se invalid." Id. at 339. Thus,
while it did not impose a categoric restriction, the court did use the language of
categoric restrictions. See id. Moreover, after citing the prudent man rule language that a trustee can invest in "every kind of property," the court did not take
the opportunity to interpret the language literally and decree that there are no
per se rules in this context. See id.
144. See MINN. STAT. § 501.125 (1945).
145. See Robert T. Willis, Jr., Prudent Investor Rule Gives Trustees New Guidelines, 19 EST. PLAN. 338, 338-39 (1992). Willis suggests that prior to the development of the prudent investor rule, it was common practice for fiduciaries, particularly family member and noncorporate fiduciaries, to invest the bulk of the trust
assets in interest-bearing instruments. See id. (noting that interest-bearing invest-
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To the extent that there was concern about avoiding speculative investments in Minnesota, that concern was put to rest by the prudent investor rule, which permits a trustee to invest in any kind of property. 14 While
this may be equally as ambiguous as the prudent man statute, the official
comment in the UPIA states "that no" 1 particular
kind of property or type of
47
investment is inherently imprudent.

In place of the old preoccupation with avoiding speculation, the
prudent investor rule requires a sensitivity to the risk tolerance of the particular trust.1' 8 Thus, investments that would have been seen as speculative
under the old law may now be considered sensible, even risk-reducing,
additions to a portfolio. 149 As an example of a trustee's responsibility to be

sensitive to the specific goals of a particular trust,' 50 the comment explains
that if the purpose of a particular trust is to support an elderly widow of
modest means, that trust will have a lower risk tolerance than a trust set up
for the benefit of a younger person of substantial wealth.'
2.

BattlingInflation

In 1977, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided In re Will of
Gershcow. 52 In Gershcow, the plaintiff-beneficiary claimed inter alia that her
trustee breached the trust by failing to reinvest assets, received in the form
of certificates of deposit, in an investment that would produce a higher
yield." 3 The rate of return during the relevant period was about five percent. 5 4 The court ultimately held that the investments were not imprudent."- Under the prudent investor rule, Gershcow would have been decided differently. '
ments, such as bank CDs, government bonds, and high-grade corporate bonds,
are made in the belief that the best way to preserve capital is to be assured of the

repayment of principal and to receive a market rate of interest).
146. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 2(d) (1996).
147. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTORACr § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 1996).
148. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 2(b) (1996) (directing the trustee to
invest for risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust).
149. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 1996)
("The universe of investment products changes incessantly. Investments that were
at one time thought too risky, such as equities, or more recently, futures, are now
used in fiduciary portfolios."); see also supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text
(explaining that if speculative investments complement the other investments in a
portfolio in such a way that industry and firm risk are decreased, then the risk of
the portfolio as a whole is decreased).
150. See infta Part V (making recommendations for practitioners).
151.

UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 22 (Supp. 1996).

152. 261 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 1977).
153. Id. at 339.
154. Id. at 337.
155. Id. at 339.
156. Gershcow illustrates the problem of ignoring inflation, which many
commentators attacked under the prudent man rule. See, e.g., Johnson, supra
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The directive that an investment strategy be based upon risk and reward objectives suitable for the specific trust recognizes the importance of
battling inflation.'57 Thus, under the prudent investor rule, a trustee
should be concerned with preserving a trust's real purchasing power and
with the effects of inflation on that power. 5 8
The new rule signals relief for trust beneficiaries, such as those in
Gershcow, whose trust assets may have been invested too conservatively.' 9
In Gershcow, the settlor created a trust with assets of about $7 5 ,000.'6° The
trust provided income for the life of three beneficiaries, and upon their
death, three remaindermen were entitled to equal shares of the trust assets.' 6' The trustee invested the assets in certificates of deposit earning
only five percent interest.16 The trustee's investment choice clearly did
not guard against inflation erosion 6 3 and, thus, most likely would be found
improper under the prudent investor rule.'64
3.

Diversification

Minnesota's prudent investor rule demands that trustees diversify the
investments of the trust.65 This duty also existed under prior law.' Under the prudent investor rule, however, trustees must diversify for a new
purpose. 6 7 Modern portfolio theory instructs that diversification entails
note 33, at 1181 (explaining that under the prudent man rule, the trustee had no
duty to protect the value of the principal from inflation and that this led to the
erosion of assets); Shelby White, The Price of Prudence, FORBES, Sept. 25, 1995, at

229, 229 ("Old rules concentrated on the preservation of capital at all costs. So
long as the capital didn't shrink in absolute terms you were fairly safe, never mind
that inflation had eaten away half the purchasing power. The new rules say you
must consider inflation and invest for total return.").
157.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS:

PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227

cmt. e (1992); see also Willis, supra note 145, at 340 ("By definition, capital cannot
be preserved if inflation is not dealt with, and inflation cannot be dealt with if the
portfolio is limited to interest-bearing instruments.").
158. 'See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 2(c)(2) (1996).
159. See id.
160. Gershcow, 261 N.W.2d at 337.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Willis, supra note 145, at 339 (demonstrating that funds invested
from 1950 to 1991 in U.S. treasury bills earning 5.3% interest would suffer 80%
inflation erosion).
164. See id. (noting that the Restatement recognizes that investments in certificates of deposit will expose the trust's capital to erosion from inflation, thereby
effectively eliminating the safety of these investments).
165. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 3 (1996).
166. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the duty to
diversify under the prudent man rule).
167. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement,
77 IOWA L. REV. 1151, 1169 (1992), republished in substantialpart in Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.
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more than simply investing in different assets; rather, diversification
should be implemented with an eye to finding assets that complement
each other and eliminate uncompensated risk.'6 Still, the prudent investor rule recognizes that diversification may be inappropriate in some circumstances,169 such as when taxes would become due on the disposition of

a concentrated low-basis portfolio or when control of a business is important to the interest of the beneficiaries. 17
4.

Portfolio Standard

Under the prudent man rule, each individual investment a trustee
made was considered on its own merits, without regard to the rest of the
portfolio.17' The individual investment standard is completely inconsistent
with modem portfolio theory.'72 If uncompensated risk is to be decreased,
a portfolio must be diversified so that different investments complement
each other in terms of risk. 7 3 The elimination of risk is achieved by the
fact that some investments will rise in value when others fall.
If a trustee's prudence is judged only with respect to the investment that fails, the
investment will appear imprudent. 7 - Revisiting the hurricane example, 76
J. 407 (1992) and Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Redefining the "PrudentInvestor Rule"for

Trustees, TR. & EST. Dec. 1990, at 14 ("Sound diversification is fundamental to the
management of uncompensated risk. It is, therefore, ordinarily required of trustees, not simply as a means of moderating the dangers inherent in investing but as
a means of minimizing uncompensated risk."); Penner, supra note 84, at 628 (noting that sound diversification of investments requires multiple assets, as well as
risk-complementary assets).
168. See Penner, supra note 84, at 628.
169. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 3 (1996) (requiring diversification
unless the trustee reasonably determines that special circumstances dictate otherwise).
170. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR AcT § 3 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 1996);
see also David R. Hodgman, FiduciaryInvestments: Draftingfor Nonconformity, 23 EST.

PLAN. 489 (1996) (examining the drafting issues that arise when the prudent investor rule does not apply).
171. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing the individual
investment standard).
172. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 90 ("Appreciation of the gains from an un-

constrained [r] ule requires acceptance of a new financial model, in which the risk
of an investment is measured as part of a portfolio, not in isolation.").
173. See supranotes 116-22 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
175. See White, supra note 156, at 229. White uses a colorful example to discuss the change in the rule, stating:
For example, if you were a fiduciary for a trust that owned shares of Microsoft, which did well, and also owned another technology company
that went belly-up, you could be sued and surcharged - that is, made to
compensate the beneficiary - for the loser, regardless of how big the
winner. Laws like that encouraged money managers to stick to so-called
safe stocks. The new law says it's okay to risk a wipeout in Zilchosoft if
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when the hurricane comes and the stock of Hurricane Insurance Company falls, a trustee could face liability, despite the fact 77that the stock in
Building Materials Company has gone through the roof.
In 1989, Minnesota amended its prudent man statute by inserting
language that appears to incorporate modem portfolio theory to some
degree. 17 The statute permitted trustees to consider the "composition of
the portfolio of the trust with regard to diversification" in determining the
prudence of a particular investment.1 This language, however, begs the
question of how much weight a court should attach to a trustee's consideration of diversification in making individual investments. 8 0 For instance, is it merely one of the factors to consider?
More importantly,
does it provide sufficient flexibility for trustees to invest in both Hurricane
Insurance Company and Building Materials Company and, yet, be confident that because the decision was based on diversification, it will not be
attacked later as being imprudent? To the extent that ambiguity existed
after the 1989 amendment, the prudent investor rule answers this question with a resounding "yes."1 2 The unmistakably clear language of the
new rule requires that a trustee's investment and management decisions
respecting individual assets be evaluated not in isolation but in the con-

Id.

you had sound reasons for buying it.

176. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 157-58.
178. See Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 340, art. 1, § 10, 1989 Minn. Laws 3021,
3023-24 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 501B.10 (Supp. 1989)); see also Haskell, supra
note 44, at 90 ("Several recent statutes supplement the prudent person principle
with language that provides that the trustee's investment decisions are to be
judged on the basis of the portfolio as a whole."); Ronald A. Sages, The Prudent
Investor Rule and the Duty Not to Delegate, TR. & EST., May 1995, at 22 (explaining
that shortly after the 1990 adoption of the Restatement, Minnesota was one of
seven states to "implement[ ] provisions somewhat comparable in scope" to the
Restatement's).
179. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.10 (Supp. 1989).
180. See In re Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d 700, 703 (N.Y. 1974).
181. In In re Bank of New York, the New York Court of Appeals answered this
question affirmatively, stating:
The record of any individual investment is not to be viewed exclusively,
of course, as though it were in its own water-tight compartment, since to
some extent individual investment decisions may properly be affected by
considerations of the performance of the fund as an entity, as in the instance, for example, of individual security decisions based in part on
considerations of diversification of the fund or of capital transactions to
achieve sound tax planning for the fund as a whole. The focus of inquiry, however, is nonetheless on the individual security as such[,] and
factors relating to the entire portfolio are to be weighed only along with
others in reviewing the prudence of the particular investment decisions.
Id.
182. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 2(b) (1996).
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss3/4
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text of the trust portfolio as a whole
Thus, trustees can now be confident that they possess the necessary flexibility to diversify the trust portfolio effectively, and they need not worry about liability
arising from an indi1 4
vidualized examination of each asset in a portfolio.
5.

Delegation

It is a general rule of trust law that trustees may not delegate their fiduciary responsibilities to others."" As a corollary, under the prudent man6
rule, trustees were not permitted to delegate their investment functions. 1
Although trustees could seek advice, they were required to come to their
own independent conclusions.187 One commentator has observed that this
often resulted in trustees rubber-stamping expert decisions and, in reality,
delegating their duties.18 As the investment world becomes more and
more sophisticated, the antiquated and unrealistic notion of nondelegation has become particularly inappropriate.8 9
In the 1960s, a variety of laws began to reverse the nondelegation
rule for investment in specific areas.19° Some commentators expressed
concern that trustees buying shares of stock in investment companies'9 or
mutual funds1 92 were improperly delegating their investment duties.
These concerns were laid to rest when
state legislatures expressly author1 93
ized trustees to invest in mutual funds.

183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TRUSTS § 171 (1959) ("The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary not to delegate to others the doing of acts which the
trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform.").
186. See id. cmt. h ("A trustee cannot properly delegate to another power to
select investments."); supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing the
prohibition on delegation under the prudent man rule).
187. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 651.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 402, 29
U.S.C. § 1102(c) (3) (1988); UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTrFUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 5,
7A U.L.A. 720 (1985).
191. See, e.g., Comment, Recent Cases, Trusts - Investments - Duty Not to Delegate - Purchaseof Shares in Investment Trust Company, 34 MINN. L. REv. 163, 164-66
(1950).

192. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 652.
193. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 11 (1996) (stating expressly that
trustees may invest in mutual funds); see also Langbein, supra note 12, at 652;
Audio Tape of Commerce, Tourism & Consumer Affairs Comm. of the Minn.
House of Representatives, H.F. 1998, Jan. 23, 1996 (testimony of Joyce James of
the First Bank National Association, on behalf of the Minnesota State Bar Associa-

tion, Probate and Trust Law Section Legislative Committee) (explaining that the
statutory changes were simply a restatement of existing law) (audio tape on file at
the Minnesota Legislative Library).
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The new rule for delegation has two components. First, the trustee
may delegate, effectively reversing the prudent man rule's nondelegation
mandate. 9 4 Second, trustee liability is adjusted to contemplate delegation. 195
Under the prudent investor rule, delegation is not only permitted,
but encouraged, and in some cases required. 96 The new rule permits trustees to delegate any trust function that a prudent person of comparable
skills would properly delegate under the circumstances. 97 In fact, a comment to the new Restatement suggests that the trustee may have a duty to
delegate under a prudent investor standard. 198
The second component of the new delegation rule requires close attention. It is one of the few places where Minnesota's Prudent Investor
Act diverges from the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.' 99 The UPIA obviates
the responsibility a trustee had under the nondelegation regime to oversee the day-to-day mechanics of investing funds.2 ° In its place, the UPIA
requires prudence in the delegation act itself.2 o' Under the UPIA, the
trustee bears duties of care, skill, and caution in selecting agents, formulating the terms of the delegation, and reviewing and monitoring the
agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation. 2
The UPIA provides that the trustee who complies with these standards is
not liable for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the function
was delegated. 23 Instead, an aggrieved beneficiary must look exclusively
to the agent, who owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care in

194.
ing text.
195.
196.
197.

See MINN. STAT. § 501B.152 (1996); infra notes 196-98 and accompany-

198.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt. j

See infra notes 199-212 and accompanying text.
See MINN. STAT. § 501B.152 (1996).
See id.

(1992).
199. See Audio Tape of Commerce, Tourism & Consumer Affairs Comm. of
the Minn. House of Representatives, H.F. 1998, Jan. 23, 1996 (testimony of Christopher Hunt of Messerli & Kramer, P.A., on behalf of the Minnesota State Bar Association, Probate and Trust Law Section Legislative Committee) (tape on file at
the Minnesota Legislative Library). Hunt testified that there are two principal areas where Minnesota's Prudent Investor Act differs from the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act. See id. The first is with respect to the delegation rule. See id. This
divergence is explained in detail infra. The second divergence is the omission of
UPIA sections 5 and 6, which set forth a trustee's duties of loyalty and impartiality
with regard to investing trust assets. See id. Hunt explained the rationale for the
divergence, noting that Minnesota has a well-established body of common law on
those duties and that the UPIA represents a departure from Minnesota's common
law. See id.
200. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR Acr § 9(a) (3), (c), 7B U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 1996).

201.
202.
203.

Id. § 9(a), 7B U.L.A. 28.
Id. § 9(a)(1)-(3), 7B U.L.A. 28.
Id. § 9(c), 7B U.L.A. 28.
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complying with the terms of the delegation."°4
Likewise, Minnesota's rule places a duty to exercise care, skill, and
caution in selecting agents, 205 formulating the scope and terms of the
delegation,0 6 and periodically reviewing the agent's actions in order to
monitor the agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the
delegation. °7 Minnesota also adopted the language of the UPIA providing
that the trustee who complies with these standards is not liable for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the function was delegated. 200 Further, an aggrieved beneficiary can look to the delegatee agent, who owes a
duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of
the delegation.209 However, the Minnesota rule provides that the agent's
duty of care is enforced by the trustee.2' ° Thus, while under the UPIA an
aggrieved beneficiary must look exclusively to the agent,211 under the
Minnesota act, the aggrieved beneficiary may bring an action against the
agent directly or compel the trustee to do so.2 2

204. See id. § 9(b), 7B U.L.A. 28. The official comment explains the rationale for the structure of the new delegation rules. Id. § 9 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 28. It
states that "[i]f the trustee delegates effectively, the beneficiaries obtain the advantage of the agent's specialized investment skills or whatever other attributes
induced the trustee to delegate." Id. If, however, "the trustee delegates to a
knave or an incompetent, the delegation can work harm upon the beneficiaries."
Id. The requirement that the fiduciary remain accountable for responsible delegation decisions "is designed to strike the appropriate balance between the advantages and the hazards of delegation." Id.
205. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.152(a) (1) (1996).
206. See id. § 501B.152(a) (2).
207. See id. § 501B.152(a) (3)
208. See id. § 501B.152(c).
209. See id. § 501B.152(b).
210. See id.
211. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTORACT § 9(b), 7B U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 1996).
212. See id.; see also Audio Tape of Commerce, Tourism & Consumer Affairs
Comm. of the Minn. House of Representatives, H.F. 1998, Jan. 23, 1996 (testimony of Christopher Hunt of Messerli & Kramer, P.A., on behalf of the Minnesota State Bar Association, Probate and Trust Law Section Legislative Committee)
(tape on file at the Minnesota Legislative Library). Hunt explained the bar association committee's decision not to recommend the UPIA's language:
We didn't like this [provision] because we thought it would encourage a
multiplicity of lawsuits by beneficiaries going after that agent when the
trustee failed to pursue the agent. So what we have added to what the
commissioners have suggested is another duty on the part of the trustee,
so that if there has been a misperformance [sic] by the agent, the trustee
has an affirmative [duty] to pursue that against the agent, even when the
delegation is proper.
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Default Rule

It should be noted that the prudent investor rule is a default standard that applies only if the trust instrument does not articulate another
fiduciary standard.2 3 The new rule expressly permits settlors to expand,
2 14
restrict, eliminate, or otherwise alter the rule by the provisions in a trust.
Trustees who rely on the terms of a trust are not liable to the beneficiaries. 1 5
V.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRACTITIONERS

Even before the advent of the prudent investor rule, the position of
trustee was not one to be envied, 21 6 and the new rule adds to the list of re-

quired trustee duties.2

7

Trustees, particularly unskilled trustees, 218 will

need advice on whether to assume the role of trustee in the first place,
what to do if they do accept the responsibility, and whether they should
seek professional assistance.2 9 Thus, before taking on the role of trustee,
213. See MIN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. I(b) (1996).
214. See id.; see also Hodgman, supra note 170, at 489 (suggesting drafting
techniques for altering the rule via trust provisions).
215. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 1(b) ("A trustee is not liable to a
beneficiary to the extent that the trustee acted in reasonable reliance on the provisions of the trust.").
216. See Robin Towns, A Trustee's Lot Is Not A Happy One, 145 NEw L.J. 1410,
1410 (1995) (-[T]he function of a trustee is an onerous one and there is much to
be said about the duties and obligations of a trustee, but little of his rights.").
217. See Hodgman, supra note 170, at 489 (explaining that because the prudent investor rule eradicates the statutory safe harbor and emphasizes diversification and thoughtful analysis, it actually imposes higher standards than the previ-

ous system, thus creating greater, not less, exposure to liability).
218. See Lyman W. Welch, How the Prudent Investor Rule May Affect Trustees,
TR. & EST., Dec. 1991, at 15, 21-22 (discussing specific issues faced by unskilled
trustees).
219. See Richard M. Todd, The PrudentInvestor: New Trust Management Rules,
22 COLO. LAw. 281, 282 (1993) (noting that trustees traditionally have not utilized
modern portfolio theory, but as prudent investing becomes more complex under
the new rules, trustees may benefit by turning to investment management consultants and money managers for aid in implementing the theory's concepts).
Part V of this Note focuses on the opportunities for and responsibilities of
practitioners who advise trustees. However, trust settlors, beneficiaries, bank trust
departments, and other investment professionals may also need guidance. Settlors will benefit from expert drafting. See Hodgman, supra note 170, at 489.
Drafting so that trustee investment decisions are governed by the Act is quite simple. Trust instruments can omit any mention of investment standards and rely on
the default aspect of the rule, or they can use language defined by the rule as invoking the new standard. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 1(b) (explaining that
the prudent investor rule is a default rule). For example, use of the words
"authorized investments," "prudent man rule," or "prudent investor rule" will in-
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those contemplating the position should be fully aware of the burdens
they will have to bear.20
Those who choose to be trustees will require guidance on several
points. First and
'2222 foremost, they must establish an overall investment strategy.21 This policy should be in writing2 and should expressly state the
223
trust purpose, how the investment strategy will achieve that purpose,
how the trust will achieve diversification, how diversification will decrease
voke the rule. See id. subd. 7 (listing language invoking the rule). Drafting so that
trustee investment decisions are not governed by the new rule may be more difficult. See Hodgman, supra note 170, at 489. Drafters must not include language
which inadvertently invokes the prudent investor standard. See MiNN. STAT. §
501B.151, subd. 7 (listing language invoking the rule). One commentator suggests that merely authorizing a trustee to invest in life insurance, maintaining the
equity in a family business, or having a conflict of interest may not be sufficient to
draft around the rule. See Hodgman, supra note 170, at 490. Rather, the trust instrument should require the trustee to take a certain course of action. See id. at
490-93 (providing specific drafting examples).
Because of the heightened responsibilities borne by trustees, beneficiaries
could prove to be a fertile source of new plaintiffs' litigation. See Todd, supra, at
282 (commenting on trustees' failure to take modern portfolio theory into account in making their investment decisions and noting that this sometimes results
in harm to beneficiaries); see also Sages, supra note 178, at 22. Writing from the
perspective of an advisor to bank trust departments, Sages suggests that there are
two primary ways a bank trust department could capitalize on the new rule. See id.
at 27. First, as an investment manager, a bank could directly manage portfolios
for individual trustees. See id. Second, it could act "as a consultant on matters of
portfolio risk assessment and reduction, asset allocation and portfolio construction." Id. Finally, in giving any advice, practitioners should include the caveat
that the prudent investor rule is new, and as such, it has yet to be tested and defined by the courts. See Hodgman, supra note 170, at 489 (noting that the fill implications of the prudent investor rule are not completely understood); Williams,
supra note 4, at 80 (opining that the definition of "prudence" will not be settled
for at least a generation).
220.

See CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR. & ERic P. HAYES, LORING:

A TRUSTEE'S

HANDBOOK § 6.2.2.2 (1994) (stating that an exhaustive examination and accounting of the portfolio should precede any decision to accept a trustee position).
221. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 2(b) (1996) (explaining that a trustee's investment decisions will be evaluated as part of an overall investment strategy); see also White, supra note 156, at 229 (describing the most important new
responsibilities as: (1) developing an overall plan that takes into account risk and
reward, the size of the portfolio, liquidity, inflation, and the needs of the beneficiaries; and (2) diversifying the portfolio).
222. See infra notes 232, 234-35 and accompanying text (discussing trustee
documentation); see alsoJohn A. Taylor, Massachusetts' Influence in Shaping the Prudent Investor Rule for Trusts, 78 MASS. L. REv. 51, 62-63 (1993) (describing the formulation of an initial opinion letter).
223. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement,
77 IOWA L. REv. 1151, 1173 (1992), republished in substantialpart in Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.
J. 407 (1992) and Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Redefining the "PrudentInvestor Rule"for
Trustees, TR. & EST. Dec. 1990, at 14.
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225
2 24
Secuncompensated risk, and how the trust will deal with inflation.
ond, the trustee must make investment decisions consistent with that
strategy. 26 In light of the abrogation of categoric restrictions, 2 21 trustees
must consider investments that have not been considered appropriate in
the past if the risk tolerance of the beneficiaries is high.2 2 8 Nontraditional
investments also may be appropriate to meet the new rule's mandate of
diversification for the purposes of avoiding uncompensated risk 229 and bat-

ding inflation.
Third, once the trust's investment portfolio is established, the trustee
must diligently monitor the investments to make sure that the trust pur-

224. See supra notes 165-70 (discussing the prudent investor rule's duty to
diversify with an eye toward eliminating uncompensated risk).
225. See supra notes 157-64 (explaining that under the prudent investor rule,
trustees should be concerned about inflation's effect upon the purchasing power
of trust assets).
226. See Todd, supranote 219, at 282.
227. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the abrogation of categoric restric-

tions).
228. See Taylor, supra note 222, at 62 (suggesting that trustees should consider the benefits of investing in nontraditional assets such as mortgages and
other asset-backed securities, real estate, venture capital, or life insurance); see also
George Crawford, A Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives?, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 307,
325 (1995) (discussing modern portfolio theory and stating that "[i]n today's financial environment, derivative vehicles - including options, futures, and swaps offer opportunities for diversification, sometimes at lower costs or risks than other
alternatives"). Trustees may also need to consider investing internationally. See
Penner, supra note 84, at 643 (suggesting that trustees invest internationally - although the rule does not require them to do so - because of the excellent portfolio benefits offered by international diversification; advising trustees to document
their reasoning if they decide not to invest internationally); see also Langbein, supra note 12, at 659 (explaining that the abrogation of categoric restrictions has
opened the door for trustees to "include in the portfolio relatively novel types of
assets .... The best example of this new openness to fiduciary investing is occurring in foreign securities.").
229. See supra note 228. For a discussion of the use of mutual funds to
achieve diversification, see Taylor, supra note 222, at 61 (observing that mutual
funds are expressly sanctioned by the new Restatement and that such pooled investment vehicles are particularly helpful in diversifying when the amount of
money under management is modest and/or the trustee is not a professional).
But see Williams, supranote 4, at 80 ("J] ust plunking all of your money in the WeNever-Lose Mutual Fund probably won't get you off the hook. Even the diversification of one mutual fund - even an index fund that tries to replicate an entire
investment market - is probably not sufficient under today's standards of prudence.").
230. See Taylor, supra note 222, at 62 (suggesting that trustees should consider hedging against inflation by investing in growth stocks, bullion, or real estate); see also Welch, supra note 218, at 21 (explaining that even in cases where a
conservative, fixed-income approach is justified, a trustee should either invest a
portion of the trust in growth-oriented securities or "be prepared to defend and
justify the decision to exclude or minimize equity investment").
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poses are being achieved. 23' Fourth, as part of their monitoring duties,
trustees should document in writing all important trust events. Such
events may include completed transactions; descriptions of meetings with
advisors, associates, or beneficiaries to consider changes in investments or
investment policies; information prepared to report investment results;
subscriptions to investment information services that are used in making
investment decisions; and the trustee's attendance at investment programs
and seminars." 2
Fifth, to the extent a trustee is incapable or lacks confidence in performing one or more of these tasks, practitioners should suggest the possibility of using a professional expert.2 33 If a trustee chooses to delegate
responsibilities, the practitioner should recommend that documentation
be kept for the file and for communication to the beneficiaries." 4 The
documentation should record the process used to select the agent, the
reasons and cost justification for the delegation, the scope of authority of
the delegation, and objective standards by which the agent's performance
can be monitored and judged.25 Practitioners should stress that delegation of investment duties does not mean that trustees can simply wash
7
their hands of investment responsibilities,2 6 particularly in Minnesota.

231. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.151, subd. 2(a) (1996) (requiring the trustee to
invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would).
232. See Welch, supranote 218, at 23; see also Taylor, supra note 222, at 62-63.
Taylor suggests that at the trust's inception, the trustee write an opinion letter articulating the trust objectives and investment strategy. See id. The trustee should
then provide periodic statements of account during the trust's life, and update
beneficiaries on specific transactions. See id. However, Taylor notes that this
should be accomplished without requiring prior consent or ratification for every
action. See id.; see also Todd, supra note 219, at 282. Todd recommends that three
things should be done once a portfolio is established. First, performance should
be monitored and records should be kept. See id. Second, performance reviews
should be made for all assets in the portfolio, taking into consideration overall
market conditions. See id. Finally, a comparison between appropriate benchmarks and investment managers with similar investment styles should be performed. See id.
233. See Welch, supra note 218, at 21 (stating the rule that an unskilled trustee need not delegate investment functions to an expert). But see Williams, supra
note 4, at 80 (stating that unskilled trustees are obliged to seek help from those
who are experts). Such investment professionals should not be hard to find. See
Welch, supra note 218, at 22. Moreover, a growing number of financial service
firms usually offer investment consulting services at a reasonable fixed rate. See id.
234. See Welch, supra note 218, at 24.
235. See id.
236. See Todd, supra note 219, at 282 (noting that the Restatement sets
guidelines for monitoring, record-keeping, and biannual reviews; and even
though an investment management consultant may supervise performance, trustees still need to be kept abreast of investment decisions and the progress of the
portfolio).
237. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text (explaining that under
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Rather, trustees should maintain regular contact with their agents and
238
monitor the progress of the trust portfolio.
Moreover, one commenta-

tor suggests that trustees should monitor the agent's "qualitative aspects,
such as personnel, investment philosophy, 23administrative
support, owner9
ship, growth, and accounts gained and lost."

VI. CONCLUSION
Minnesota's adoption of the Prudent Investor Act marks an exciting
time for practitioners, settlors, beneficiaries, and trustees. Practitioners
will enjoy new business opportunities and responsibilities in advising settlors, beneficiaries, and trustees of their relative rights and obligations under the new Act. Settlors will enjoy increased confidence that assets
placed in trust will be managed to achieve their intended objectives.
Beneficiaries likely will benefit through increased investment returns with
unchanged risk levels. Finally, trustees will be free to invest trust assets in
a manner consistent with contemporary economic thinking and practice.
SjurMidness

the UPIA, trustees who properly delegate their investment responsibilities to
agents generally are not liable to the beneficiaries for an agent's mismanagement,
but under the Minnesota rule, trustees have an affirmative duty to pursue claims
against agents).
238. See Todd, supra note 219, at 282.
239. Id.
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